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1. INTRODUCTION

During the 1990s, powerful development institutions like the World Bank came to see the social networks and norms of the rural poor in developing countries as “assets” to be tapped for poverty alleviation. Defined by Putnam (1995) as “features of social organization such as networks, norms and social trust that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit” (p. 67), social capital was proclaimed the “missing link” in development (Grootaert, 1997). Its contribution to various types of development outcomes became the subject of practical experimentation and scholarly research. The animating hypothesis of this large research program has been that social capital, as an asset adhering in villages, regions, or even nation-states, is good for both democracy and development.

Based on an ethnographic study of how farmers in rural North India secure benefits from a Special Economic Zone (SEZ)1 being established in their village, this paper argues that the Putnam-inspired theory of collective social capital is not able to explain how networks, norms, and trust interact in a process of socio-economic change. It then extends Bourdieu’s distinct theory of individual social capital to provide an alternative model. While sociologists have largely adopted a macro-critique of the role of social capital in economic development, questioning its independence from and causal priority over government action (Evans, 1996; Fox, 1996; Heller, 1996; Lam, 1996; Tarrow, 1996), this paper builds on research that questions its micro-foundations (Beall, 2001). It argues that networks, norms, and trust should be treated not as composite stocks, but as independent variables that, especially during processes of economic development, often stand in considerable tension with each other.

This analysis proceeds from Portes’ (2000) observation that there are two distinct meanings of social capital: as social networks that convey advantages to individuals or families, and as “stocks” of networks, norms, and trust adhering in larger social units that enable collective action for mutual benefit (see also Harriss, 2001; Schuurman, 2003, p. 994). The first, which we might call the individual social capital thesis, looks at social capital as an unequally distributed private good and is associated with the work of Pierre Bourdieu. The second, which we might call the collective social capital thesis, sees social capital as a public good adhering in social units above the individual and family and is associated with the work of Robert Putnam.2 While a few scholars have deployed the first conception to understand development outcomes (Beall, 2001; Cleaver, 2005; Desai & Dubey, 2011; Jeffrey, 2001; Jeffrey, Jeffery, & Jeffery, 2008), it is the latter that has dominated the study of development (cf. Adrianzen, 2014; Grootaert, 1997; Krishna, 2002; Narayan, 1999; Narayan & Pritchett, 1999; Woolcock, 1998; World Bank, 1997, 2000).

As Portes has observed, however, there is substantial tension between the Bourdieuan concept of social capital as unequal networks that convey advantages to individuals, and the Putnamite conception of social capital as a collective property of groups. This is because individuals often use their unequal access to social networks to pursue their individual interests at the cost of social norms, trust, and collective solidarity (Portes, 2000, p. 4). The two versions of social capital reflect distinct conceptions of social structure and can thus be expected to have different implications for development. Which social capital is more useful for understanding contemporary processes of economic development and social change?

This paper attempts to demonstrate the limitations of the collective social capital thesis and advance the individual social capital thesis by showing how networks, norms, and trust come into increasing tension with each other as farmers in the state of Rajasthan, India engage the land markets created by a Special Economic Zone (SEZ). In 2005, one of India’s largest SEZs was established in previously rural villages outside the city of Jaipur, and began to attract some of the largest Information Technology (IT) and Business

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Process Outsourcing (BPO) companies operating in the country. Government officials proclaimed that the project, as part of the Indian government’s flagship SEZ program, and one of the largest private investments in Rajasthan’s history, would bring development and prosperity to a rural area that was largely dependent on rain-fed agriculture. I conducted over one year of ethnographic fieldwork in the villages adjacent to the SEZ, including participant observation, informal interviews with farmers, land brokers, and real estate investors, and a random-sample survey of 94 families in four villages. Based on this fieldwork, I show: (1) how inequalities in individual social capital, rooted in the agrarian class structure, enabled a section of farmers to capture substantial rents as brokers of the dramatic real estate speculation that the SEZ generated; and (2) how this use of individual social capital came at the expense of fellow villagers, violated collective norms, undermined trust, and removed any possibility for collective action around shared grievances toward the project. Through the case of rural land brokerage, I thus show how individual social capital (unequal connections) undermines features of social life associated with collective social capital (trust, norms, and collective action), and can contribute to a development tragedy for the rural poor.

My argument is that there is a “dark side” to social capital. Such an argument presumes an agreed upon concept of social capital that produces opposite results under different conditions. It would be more correct to argue that there are two kinds of social capital that have different developmental implications. I wish, however, to make a somewhat stronger argument: the existence of individual social capital challenges the conception of society that underlies the collective social capital thesis. The latter, I argue, is untenable to the extent that it collapses aspects of social life—networks, norms, and trust—that should in fact be separated. If networks, norms, and trust do, under certain circumstances, cohere into a collective “stock” available to the members of a given social unit (a village, for example), the collective social capital thesis fails to specify those conditions. Once the significance of individual social capital is fully recognized, the collective social capital must explain the conditions under which collective norms and trust can contain, and under what conditions they are undermined by, the self-interested exploitation of individual networks. I suggest that the collective social capital thesis is least likely to apply to egalitarian rural societies in the process of economic change. It is above all when new forms of wealth and economic activity are being introduced into egalitarian rural contexts that established norms and trust are challenged, undermined, and opportunistically exploited by more powerful and better-connected individuals. In such situations, individual social capital is more likely to win the day and be an obstacle to inclusive development.

2. TWO MODELS OF NETWORKS, NORMS, AND TRUST

In what follows, I present the two models of social capital and their assumptions about the relationship between networks, norms, and trust. I show how theories of collective social capital falter when confronted with the power of individual social capital and its potential tensions with norms and trust. I then reconstruct Bourdieu’s theory of social capital to provide an alternative model of how networks, norms, and trust dynamically relate to each other in a context of socio-economic change.

(a) The collective social capital thesis

It is Robert Putnam’s theory of collective social capital that has captured the imagination of social scientists, development institutions, and political leaders in a way that few sociological concepts have (Woolcock, 2010). Subsequent studies have tried to show that uneven endowments of “networks, norms and trust” at various social units matter for development. The general contention is that villages or regions with greater propensities for cooperation and collective action—higher “stocks” of social capital—have higher levels of socio-economic development (Grootaert, 1997; Krishna, 2002; Krishna & Uphoff, 1999; Narayan & Pritchett, 1999; Uphoff & Wijayaratna, 2000; Woolcock, 1998; World Bank, 1997, 2000).

While this argument has an intuitive plausibility, it is based on an assumption about how networks, norms, and trust relate to each other in any social milieu. In Making Democracy Work, Putnam (1993) refers to social capital as “norms of reciprocity and networks of civic engagement” (p. 167). In a subsequent article, he defined it more precisely as, “features of social organization such as networks, norms and social trust that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit” (Putnam, 1995, p. 67). While the causal arrow between these three features of social life is not always specified, Putnam’s argument is that dense networks of horizontal exchange tend to be associated with strong norms of reciprocity and high levels of social trust (Putnam, 1993, pp. 172, 177). In this sense, networks, norms, and trust constitute a locally available “stock”: a composite asset that represents a community’s capacity for cooperation and collective action. In this view, the world is comprised of villages, cities, regions, or even nations that have uneven endowments of social capital (clusters of networks, norms, and trust); these endowments are a significant, if not primary, cause of uneven development.

In one of the most rigorous and influential applications of the social capital thesis to development, and rural India specifically, political scientist Anirudh Krishna (2002) offers support for an amended social capital thesis based on a survey of 69 Indian villages in the states of Rajasthan and Madhya Pradesh. Because Krishna’s geographical focus overlaps with that of my own study (in Rajasthan, India), and because it instructively exposes the lacunae of the collective social capital thesis, Krishna’s book warrants more detailed scrutiny.

Correctly observing that formal associations have limited scope in rural India, Krishna constructs his own “locally relevant” Social Capital Index based on measurements of informal networks and norms—levels of cooperation in work and agriculture, assessments of trust, and solidarity—that are meant to capture each village’s “aggregate potential for mutually beneficial collective action” (Krishna, 2002, p. 67). Krishna finds that, with one important intervening condition, villages with higher scores on this index also score higher on various development indicators, measured by villagers’ success in implementing government development programs and their overall quality of basic services. The condition, however, is that villages’ endowments of social capital only translate into better development “performance” if there also exist appropriate agents to “activate this stock and use it to produce a flow of benefits” (Krishna, 2002, p. 29). Specifically, the social capital effect only holds in villages blessed with a stratum of “new leaders,” or educated but often unemployed village youth who mediate fellow villagers’ interaction with government agencies and the market. These new leaders, having “regular contacts with state officials and market operators,” and being well versed in their practices and procedures, “help villagers
organize themselves in ways that are more likely to succeed” (Krishna, 2002, p. 9),” thus activating their social capital for development and democracy.

Despite adding the mediating variable of local agency, Krishna’s conception of social capital is similar to Putnam’s: “social capital is an asset, a functioning propensity for mutually beneficial collective action, with which communities are endowed to diverse extents” (Krishna, 2002, p. 2). In this view, networks, norms, and trust are coterminous with village or regional boundaries, and with each other. While Krishna’s “new leaders” are villagers whose networks are not contained by village boundaries, he maintains that it is not the norm for these leaders to exploit their mediating role for rent-seeking (Krishna, 2002, p. 49). Rather, these more savvy and better-connected individuals simply activate their villages’ composite stocks of networks, norms, and trust for the collective good. Combining Putnam and Krishna, we might state the amended collective social capital thesis as follows:

Networks, norms, and trust are mutually coterminous and can constitute a “stock” or “asset” for various supra-individual social units (neighborhoods, villages, towns, regions, or even countries). This stock of social capital represents a social unit’s ability to cooperate and act collectively to obtain collective developmental benefits from states and markets. However, this may require mediating agents who facilitate the connection between members of their community and outside institutions, activating social capital for the public good.

(b) The breakdown of the collective social capital thesis

Several critics have pointed out the danger of circularity in this argument (Fine, 2001; Harriss, 2001; Harriss & de Renzo, 1997; Portes, 1998, 2000). If social capital is a social unit’s propensity for cooperation and collective action, and if it is then measured by people’s existing engagement in collective action (Putnam’s membership in associations or Krishna’s informal modes of cooperation), it becomes tautological. And if one cannot specify in advance what kinds of networks and norms produce collective action for mutual benefit, then the hypothesis is unfalsifiable. Indeed, those studying the role of social capital in development have found that in different places, different types of social networks constitute social capital—in some places they may be horizontal and involve homogeneous actors, in others they can be vertical and heterogeneous (Krishna, 2002, pp. 56, 63). Given this inability to consistently define what constitutes social capital, it becomes unclear whether this research has in fact identified a consistent cause for its desired outcomes.

The second troubling feature of the collective social capital thesis, found in both Putnam and Krishna, is its ad hoc treatment of anomalous outcomes. When social capital is found to produce what are regarded as “negative” outcomes (exclusion, exploitation, or monopolization of resources), and the types of networks and norms that gave rise to it are not retroactively redefined as “not social capital,” it is then conceded that social capital can have a “dark side.” This dark side is explained by a sub-categorization of social capital into “bridging” and “bonding” capital, with pathologies arising from an over-abundance of the latter (Narayan, 1999; Putnam, 2000, pp. 350–363). The dark side of social capital forms a residual category for anomalous outcomes not predicted by the theory, but does not explain them (Riley, 2010, p. 11). Krishna’s need to introduce well-connected village leaders into his explanation is another version of the same strategy: where collective social capital does not have the presumed effects, another variable capturing different kinds of networks is introduced, but its relationship to the networks that really count as social capital remains under-theorized.

My argument is that these conceptual problems arise for the collective social capital thesis because, on a micro-level, it treats networks, norms, and trust as a composite “stock.” First, we know that networks connect individuals across scales and are not confined to any social unit (Bebbington & Perrault, 1999, p. 401). 3 The distinction between bridging and bonding capital is a recognition of this, but it considers both forms of capital to be the property of groups not individuals. Krishna’s analysis of local leaders who are well-connected to outside actors, though not explicitly theorized as such, points to the fact that different individuals within a social unit have different “connections” that vary in their extent and utility. His reconstruction of the collective social capital thesis thus paradoxically exposes its main lacunae: what is the relationship between networks that connect individuals within a social unit like a village, and those that connect them to actors outside a village? Are both part of the “stock” of social capital?

Krishna’s characterization of well-connected village leaders as public-spirited activators of their villages’ collective social capital is necessary for the social capital thesis—if they were otherwise then their mediation of development resources could be interpreted as patronage, typically seen as the opposite of social capital (Putnam, 1993). However, this assumption, which is not supported by long-term ethnographic research, sits awkwardly with the well-established sociological insight that individuals derive significant power and benefit from connecting or “bridging” diverse groups (Burt, 1992, 2002, pp. 157–158; Simmel, 1950, p. 154). It also stands in tension with the significant historical and sociological research on brokers and middlemen in India from the colonial period to the present. Whether it is connecting villagers to government resources and “fixing” bureaucratic problems for commission (Reddy & Haragopal, 1985; Srivastava & Chaturvedi, 1986), peddling influence and patronage (Plunkett, 1984), brokering labor (Bremner, 1996; Mosse et al., 2002) or otherwise acting as market intermediaries (Bayly, 1983, pp. 371, 412), few doubt that such well-connected mediators use their position for financial or political gain, often in alliance with corrupt officials. 4 For these reasons, brokers and middlemen have long attracted moral opprobrium (Bailey, 1960, p. 185; Bayly, 1983, p. 412). Krishna’s puzzling assumption that well-connected “leaders” are public-spirited servants of the greater village good reflects the inability of the collective social capital theory to grapple with extra-local “connections” as a source of individual power rather than collective utility.

Second, there is an unclear relationship in the collective social capital theory between the structure of networks and their content. Given the inability of this literature to identify consistent kinds of networks that generate the norms and trust amenable to collective action, why are networks, norms, and trust treated as a cluster rather than as a set of independent variables? Why not observe how networks, norms, and trust interact in any given setting to produce a variety of development outcomes (and not exclusively positive ones)? This would require addressing a question that a methodological focus on pre-conditions and outcomes occludes: how do norms and trust change over time as networks get mobilized in the process of development? The static picture of norms and trust as initial “stocks” begs the question of how these change as people utilize networks for various ends in a changing social context. Understanding the dynamic relationship between networks, norms, and trust requires greater ethnographic attention to micro-social processes that are obscured when these distinct phenomenon are collapsed into indices.
in tension with pre-existing norms. Even more powerfully in his study of rural Malaysia, symbolic "laundering their social capital. For Bourdieu, norms are not static but rather the malleable stakes in dynamic strategies to maintain and accumulate capital. As he shows in his study of rural Algeria (Bourdieu, 1979), and Scott (1985) illustrates even more powerfully in his study of rural Malaysia, symbolic struggles over norms are of particular relevance to rapidly changing societies—such as rural villages in the developing world—where new modes of economic behavior often stand in tension with pre-existing norms. In sum, economic change in rural areas of the Global South is just as likely to unleash divisive struggles over norms than to unleash collective action based on shared ones.

We can summarize this Bourdieuan model of individual social capital thus:

Individuals within any social unit are endowed with social networks of unequal quality and quantity, which are rooted in class inequalities (economic and cultural capital). These networks are not necessarily coterminous with any social unit, and have no necessary relationship with the norms or levels of trust within it. In fact, individuals more often than not use their networks for individual gain (converting it into other forms of capital) rather than collective good. This use and conversion of social capital can often conflict with norms and undermine trust, creating conflict and symbolic struggle rather than collective action. This is particularly likely to occur in rapidly changing economic contexts where new forms of economic activity clash with pre-existing norms.

Understood in this way, social capital has a very different relationship to development than what is most commonly attributed to it. If social capital is an unequally distributed form of power that allows certain people to differentially exploit new economic opportunities or government programs because of “who they know,” then it will tend to reproduce or expand existing class inequalities. Such individual use of social capital may in fact violate collective norms and trust in ways that undermine collective action toward securing collective development outcomes. If development is taken to mean a broad-based and inclusive improvement in economic and social well-being, particularly for the poor (Sen, 2000), then social capital may be one of the most significant obstacles to its realization. The implication is that development interventions should aim to undermine or check social capital rather than harness it.

In the following analysis, I will lend empirical support to this vision of social capital. I show how unequal endowments of social capital determine the ability of rural residents to appropriate rents as land brokers in the new real estate economy generated by a Special Economic Zone. The ability of brokers to forge connections based on at least an instrumental trust between socially distant parties (fellow farmers and outside investors) enables them to appropriate significant commissions on the sale of their fellow villagers’ farmland. Examining the social background of these village brokers, I then trace their social capital to the economic inequalities bequeathed by incomplete land reforms in rural India. Finally, I show how the utilization by village brokers of their social connections for individual gain cannibalized the trust that made their work possible in the first place, violated previously held social norms regarding land and economic behavior more generally, and thus initiated a symbolic struggle over the normative status of brokers and their newly acquired wealth. Brokers’ manipulation of their social capital exacerbated economic inequalities in the village, created extreme economic distress for many poor villagers, and undermined any potential that may have existed for collective action based on widely held grievances toward the SEZ. In the conclusion, I draw out the implications of these findings for the concept of social capital and its application to development.

3. CONTEXT: SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONES AND DEVELOPMENT IN RURAL INDIA

There are two senses of the word development: one refers to programs of poverty alleviation and social welfare implemented by governments and NGOs; the other refers to the
overall process of political-economic change. While many studies of social capital have focused on the ability of rural people to access government programs, fewer have focused on their ability to obtain benefits from the major economic changes that are sweeping their countries. While access to government programs is important to many rural livelihoods in India today, a related and clearly significant question is how rural people are able to benefit from the overall growth trajectory of the country. Post-liberalization, India’s growth model has de-prioritized agriculture while placing greater emphasis on fostering a knowledge-based economy, attracting private investment, and nurturing a booming real estate market. Reflecting these priorities, the Indian government passed the Special Economic Zones Act in 2005, which allowed for private companies to build highly liberalized enclaves that would offer a host of tax and tariff incentives to exporting firms, and allow the zones’ developers to construct lucrative housing colonies (in effect, satellite cities) on the land not being used for production. Almost two-thirds of India’s nearly 600 approved SEZs are in the IT and BPO sector (Government of India, 2014). Almost all of them are being located on land acquired by the government on the rural periphery of cities, or near ports. Special Economic Zones thus provide a perfect opportunity to study how rural Indians—who constitute almost 69% of the Indian population (Census of India, 2011)—are able to benefit from the core features of the country’s economic development.

Because their establishment often entails the forcible acquisition of large amounts of agricultural land from farmers, SEZs have run into serious opposition across rural India (Chakravorty, 2013; Jenkins et al., 2014; Levien, 2012, 2013a; Sampat, 2010). However, some have argued that these political struggles could be averted and farmers made to benefit from SEZs and other land development projects if only they were given a larger stake in them (Bardhan, 2011; Chakravorty, 2013). The political pressure that these farmers’ movements have generated has led several states to adopt more generous compensation policies that seek to build consent from farmers by giving them a higher share in the escalating real estate values that large corporate projects inevitably generate in previously agricultural areas. In Rajasthan, a policy of giving farmers small developed land parcels next to industrial or commercial projects for which their land is acquired has been in place for over a decade. When Rajasthan became home to one of the first large SEZs to be built in North India, it provided an ideal case in which to observe the developmental consequences of India’s growth model for rural farmers, under the most favorable conditions.

4. FIELDWORK: A SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONE IN RURAL RAJASTHAN

In 2005, the state government of Rajasthan announced the acquisition of 2,000 acres of private farmland and 1,000 acres of public grazing land from nine villages outside the city of Jaipur for the Mahindra World City SEZ. The multi-purpose SEZ, part of the efforts of the Rajasthan government to lure major IT/BPO companies to the state, was to be anchored by a large campus for the India IT giant Infosys. As developer, Mahindra would sell developed land parcels to IT/BPO companies and other industrial users who would be provided with a host of tax and regulatory incentives by the Indian government (as part of the SEZ Act) and use approximately half the land to build residential housing and other urban amenities. The MWC, like most of India’s new privately developed SEZs, was not to be an old-fashioned industrial estate, but an “integrated business city.” Land acquisition for the project began in 2005 and the zone became operational by 2008.

I arrived in the villages in December 2009 after spending the previous three months in Jaipur interviewing government officials, SEZ developers, and other key informants. After a 1-month stay in the pre-dominantly Brahmin village of Shivpura where I had managed to make a contact, I settled into the home of a Dalit (lower caste) family in the larger, mixed-caste village of Rajpura. Because of its diverse social composition, and because it was the largest village to have its land acquired for the SEZ, Rajpura provided an ideal base for my fieldwork (which also extended regularly, though in less depth, into the other surrounding villages). While my research question was broader than the role of social capital in development, it became immediately apparent that land brokers were key figures in the villages’ post-SEZ life. I came to know which farmers had been acting as land brokers from fellow villagers, or by their own admission in conversations at tea (chai) stalls, in village alleys, or in people’s homes. My methods were necessarily opportunistic. When I met a broker, I asked them how the transactions worked, how they got into the business, how they made their contacts, how many deals they had facilitated, how much money they had made, what they reinvested their earnings in, and other details about the local land market. From hundreds of such conversations I formed a consistent and coherent picture of the nature of land brokerage. While brokers’ forthrightness about the size of their earnings varied (and depended on whether the conversation was in public or private), and some were hesitant to admit to being a broker until pushed by fellow villagers, their account of the business was often frank and independently confirmed by others. Because the bulk of my ethnographic fieldwork consisted of conversations with different farmers about how they fared from the SEZ, and particularly the outcome of selling their land and compensation plots, I also collected many accounts of other people’s dealings with brokers. Opinions about brokers were not hard to solicit.

I attempted to systematize these ethnographic findings with a survey of Rajpura and the three neighboring villages of Shivpura, Neelpur, and Jetnura. These four villages were chosen because they are all close to the SEZ and together capture the full range of caste-groups in the area. The survey of 94 households was based on a random sample generated from local voting lists, which include all adults over the age of 18 in each village. I personally conducted a household survey of each individual selected from the list. The survey sampled 12% of the households in each of the four villages. The survey questionnaire consisted of 29 questions that captured household socio-economic status before and after the SEZ (occupation, education, landholdings, livestock, agricultural assets, extent of wage labor, relative income and food security, and subjective assessment of well-being) and asked for details of their land transactions: how much land they sold (or were forced to sell), how much money they received, how they reinvested their money, and whether someone in the family was a land broker. Of the 94 families surveyed, 13 reported having one family member engaged in land brokering. When possible, I informally interviewed these brokers or, failing that, their families. The paper also draws upon an analysis of 10 years of village land records and in-depth interviews with large brokers, real estate investors, and local government officials. Methodologically, this research employs the extended case method (Buraiow, 2009), which seeks to reconstruct theory—in this instance, social capital—through the prolonged ethnographic study of strategically chosen cases.
5. A REAL ESTATE BOOM IN RURAL RAJASTHAN

The establishment of the SEZ on the agricultural and grazing land of Rajpura and surrounding villages had some immediate negative consequences. While it enabled a “knowledge economy”—including campuses for Infosys and Deutsche Bank—to take root in the zone, it triggered a disaccumulation of productive assets in the surrounding villages. Not only did people lose their agricultural land, but the loss of fodder triggered a massive selling-off of livestock, which decimated total livestock holdings by 66% (including 56% of buffalo and 76% of goats). Meanwhile, the zone’s IT/BPO industries provided employment to only 14% of dispossessed families who lacked the requisite education for all but the temporary, sub-contracted positions as guards, gardeners, or janitors that were also few in number.

Without significant employment, the main potential benefit of the SEZ for the surrounding villages was a dramatic real estate boom, as the prospective arrival of multinational companies enticed speculative real estate capital to leapfrog from the immediate peripheries of Jaipur into rural areas. Major real estate companies bought up land around the SEZ to build high-end housing colonies to cater to the zone’s prospective middle-class professionals. Other real estate concerns and individual investors from Jaipur, Delhi, and Mumbai bought up farmland as speculative investments. As Figure 1 shows, annual land sales in Rajpura increased by a factor of 10 as land prices soared from about $4,000 per bigha (one quarter of a hectare) to over $68,000 per bigha.\(^1\)

The compensation policy offered by the Rajasthan government to farmers who had their land acquired for the SEZ incorporated them into this real estate boom. Instead of providing the usual, government-fixed, below-market rate, the government tried to, in the words of one official, “buy peace” from the farmers by giving them small developed land parcels—zoned for commercial and residential use and installed with basic infrastructure—adjacent to the SEZ that were ¼ the size of their original agricultural land. This market-based compensation model gave farmers a small stake in the SEZ’s enhancement of property values, and was thus more generous and inclusive than in most cases of land acquisition.

Long before they ever physically materialized, a market emerged for the rights to these compensation plots (conveyed through power of attorney contracts) and real estate investors began rapidly buying them in anticipation of future appreciation. Today, at least three-quarters of these plots are in the hands of outside investors.\(^1\) This process of real estate speculation in both compensation plots and in the agricultural land surrounding the SEZ gave rise to a large stratum of local land brokers (dalals), themselves from farming backgrounds, who facilitated these transactions in coordination with Jaipur-based brokers. Such brokers are a pervasive feature of land markets in rural India.

6. BROKERING TRUST

Land brokers use social connections to solve a problem that arises when outside urban parties look to buy land in rural areas: there is great social distance, as well as ingrained mutual distrust, between buying and selling parties in a situation where much can go wrong. The role of dalals is to bridge this social gulf and reduce this trust deficit, at least until the transaction is concluded. There are typically several layers of dalals—a buyer from Delhi might have a Delhi-based dalal, who deals with a Jaipur dalal, who then contacts a village dalal. But as one real estate investor put it, “The local dalal is the most important link among the chain” (Interview, March 22, 2010).

From the buyer’s point of view, this is because, in this investor’s words, “it is difficult to communicate . . . [and] have confidence in the local people” (Interview, March 22, 2010). To an urban outsider, village life is opaque, and there is a concern that “clever farmers” will try to rip off middle-class city-dwellers. In land transactions, the specific fear is that investors will provide the advance money at the time a purchase agreement is signed, but the farmer will subsequently decide to demand more money before the transaction is

![Figure 1. Land sales in Rajpura.](image-url)
concluded and registered. There is also the very real danger that the investor buys land that is disputed or not properly divided among heirs—a common phenomenon in rural India—and therefore does not get a clear title. Both of these scenarios can create a situation of legal ambiguity that might take a decade to solve in backlogged courts, or may necessitate hefty bribes to judges. In such a situation of deficient structural trust, the village dalal—presumably trusted by the urban dalal—provides the interpersonal trust (Lewis & Weigert, 1985; Luhmann, 1979) and local knowledge (about who owns what, and whose property is in dispute) to minimize the risk of duplicity on the village end.

But the village dalal is even more important for his role in making the selling farmer trust the outside buyer. Farmers have good reason not to repose their faith in unknown urban people from a higher class. The buyer could provide the advance money, but fail to pay the full purchase price, creating a legal ambiguity that will prevent them from selling the land and that will be difficult to resolve (and could very well be resolved against their favor by judges or land mafia).12 Given low levels of literacy, there is also the fear of being cheated by contracts that they do not fully comprehend. The local dalal, crucially, has to be someone trusted by the farmer. This often means not just a fellow villager, but an acquaintance, or someone from the same caste. If the village dalal contacted by the urban dalal is not a sufficiently close acquaintance of the farmer, he may bring in another village dalal into the chain and split the commission. The greater the social distance between the dalal and farmer, the more work that needs to be done at building trust. One dalal from a nearby town explained to me how he would, over the course of several months, pay daily visits to the home of a potential seller, drinking chai, smoking beedis (country cigarettes) and building confidence in the farmer that he was a trustworthy person (not unlike an ethnographer). This kind of symbolic work, which I observed continually throughout my fieldwork, is a necessary component of extending trust across social space. While Granovetter (1985, p. 490) argues that personal ties of this kind are particularly important in markets involving repeated transactions, in the case of rural land sales, it is the kind of symbolic work that makes trust all the more significant.

In sum, the farmer wants to get fully paid, the investor wants to take clean possession, and the village dalal, in the words of one urban investor, “generate faith between both parties and make possible the deal” (Interview, March 22, 2010). They use locally available relations of trust and try to extend them to an outside party. It is not simply that there is a structural hole (Burt, 1992, 2002)—a lack of overlap between village and urban networks—that needs to be bridged: potential buyers know where the land is and theoretically could come to the village and approach farmers directly. But in the absence of interpersonal trust (Lewis & Weigert, 1985; Luhmann, 1979) between the buyer and seller and structural trust in the legal system, there is a need for local media tors who can mobilize and extend their own relations of interpersonal trust. Brokers construct the “non-contractual basis of contract” (Durkheim, 1984), allowing rural land to become treated as a commodity. In exchange, they take a commission of 1–2% of the sale price, which can be quite substantial in India’s soaring land markets.

Attracted by the possibility of easy gains in the hundreds or thousands of dollars per deal (where most wage labor pays around $70 per month), many young men try their hands in the dalali (brokerage) business. While it is a bit of an over-statement, it was a common saying in the villages that every family had a dalal (“ek family, ek dalal”). My survey found that 14% of families had a dalal in the family—though it is quite possible, for reasons that will become clear, that there was under-reporting.

### 7. THE SOCIAL CAPITAL OF BROKERS

Becoming a land broker requires above all social capital in the form of individual connections outside one’s village, and such connections are distributed unequally. When I asked them what it took to become a dalal, almost all of the dozens of dalals I spoke with said contacts (sampark) and associated information (jankari). Money does help because with it you can engage in the more profitable transactions that involve providing an advance to the seller, agreeing to purchase it at a later date, and meanwhile finding an outside buyer to conclude the purchase at a higher price. But money is not necessary for working on commission. While a certain amount of business savvy was clearly necessary—perhaps exaggerated by one dalal who boasted, “the mind should be talented”—formal education was clearly not. I found only a slightly greater incidence of dalals among those who had studied past the 10th grade—1.7% compared to 1.1% of those who had not. In fact, it was a common joke in the village that many dalals “don’t know how to write their names, but know how to calculate commission.” Much more crucial were social networks spanning the village and city. As dalal Gangaram Sharma explained, “You just make the connection (sambandi)” (Fieldnotes, March 10, 2010). This was incidentally reinforced for me by the numerous attempts of local dalals to bring me into land deals, even though I told them I was not a businessman and I had no money to invest. I was repeatedly told that neither was necessary, I just needed to bring in an “excellent outside party.”

When I asked dalals how they made the contacts that allowed them to become a broker, the vast majority told me that it was through connections from previous nonmanual work or business experience in Jaipur (the nearest major city, and capital of Rajasthan). In my survey, I found that 29% of families with formal employment or a business outside the village had a dalal, compared to only 8% of those families who did not. While this business/employment involvement also captures economic and cultural capital, participant observation and interviews made it clear that social capital, although arising from other inequalities, was the key proximate factor. By social capital I mean, following Bourdieu, the extent and quality of one’s social networks.

As the acting village sarpanch (elected head) and land broker Mahinder Singh explained, “If you want to be a dalal, you need contacts to sell the land” (Fieldnotes, July 9, 2010). Contacts also facilitate the formation of brokerage partnerships, which allow one to mobilize more resources for more lucrative (non-commission) transactions. Brokerage, Mahinder explained to me quite sociologically, “is a business of groups joining together” (Fieldnotes, July 9, 2010). The ability to form groups and networks that matter economically is, of course, not distributed equally. The connections that matter are with those who either have money to invest or are connected to people with money to invest. In a village, that typically means having contacts in the city. One Brahmin dalal reported making his contacts through the customers of his sweet shop in Jaipur, in which he is a partner with the former sarpanch of Shivpura (also a dalal). He helpfully explained, “If you have a business or work in Jaipur, you have more connections” (Fieldnotes, March 10, 2010). Another dalal made his
contacts through previous work in a Jaipur jewelry shop, another owned a cement business in Jaipur, and many _dalals_ were previously milk middlemen—those who transport raw milk from the village to retailers in the city—adapting their old intermediary role to a new economic opportunity. Of the few who did not make their contacts in Jaipur, several did so as owners of village tea (_chai_) stalls—the obvious points of entry and information for an outside _dalal_ looking to buy land. I encountered only one case in which someone made his contacts through manual labor, highlighting the importance of the _quality_ and not simply the existence of social networks. This lower caste _dalal_, who runs a small pirate DVD shop in the village, explained that he was doing wage labor in Jaipur and told his boss that he could help him buy land near the SEZ. While his example demonstrates a certain amount of fluidity in who can entrepreneurially create a connection and tap into real estate rents, he was a small _dalal_, and had only managed to do two or three deals. For the most part, the networks that mattered were built through less menial work and business experience outside the village.

While these networks were not necessarily within castes (Harriss-White, 2003; Jeffrey, 2001), the upper castes had more of them and were consequentially disproportionately represented among _dalals_. As Table 1 shows, 58% of the upper, or so-called “General Caste” families (mostly Brahmins) had a business or nonmenial employment experience outside the village before the SEZ came. Among the agriculturally dominant Jat caste, 44% of families had such an economic foothold outside the village. In contrast, only 19% of what the Indian government classifies as “Otherwise Backward Caste” (OBC) families and only 6% of the lower “Scheduled Caste” (SC) and “Scheduled Tribe” (ST) families had such business or formal employment experience beyond the village. Correspondingly, 21% of General Caste families and 25% of Jat families contained a land broker, compared to only 10% of OBC families and 6% of SC/ST families. Within the Scheduled Castes, there were a few _dalals_ among the slightly better off Balai sub-caste, but none among the generally poorer sub-castes of Raergas, Beirwas or sweepers. The upper castes had more, higher-value social networks that they could mobilize to take advantage of a new economic opportunity, such as a hot real estate market emerging in their villages.

8. HISTORICAL ORIGINS OF PRESENT DISTRIBUTION OF SOCIAL CAPITAL

This uneven distribution of the extent and quality of social networks within the village has its historical roots in the failures of post-independence land reforms to sufficiently transform highly unequal agrarian social structures. During the early 1950s, land reform in Rajasthan abolished feudal intermediasies (jagirdars) and brought former tenants into a direct relationship with the state as small-holding cultivators (Rudolph & Rudolph, 1984). However, as in most parts of India, the main beneficiaries were the larger cultivating castes (in this area, the Jats) and upper castes (like Brahmins) that were better able to manipulate land reform procedures to their advantage (Chakravarti, 1975; Rosin, 1987; Singh, 1964). Meanwhile, the former Rajput lords evaded land ceilings and retained very large holdings by registering their land in the names of extended family members and loyal retainers (Rosin, 1987; Singh, 1964). The result was an incomplete reform of the feudal agrarian structure, and a legacy of large inequalities in land holdings between upper and lower castes. As seen in Table 2, when the SEZ arrived, Jat families in the four villages surveyed held on average 7.3 hectares of land, General Castes (mostly Brahmins) 4.6 hectares, Otherwise Backward Castes 3.3 (with 10% landless), and the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes 2.2 (with 15% landless). The large outlier not included in the survey was the single family of the former Rajput lord (jagirdar or _thakur_), which, by the admission of its main heir, still controlled at least 375 hectares when the SEZ arrived.

Such unequal landholdings provided the basis for the uneven ability of different castes to diversify from agriculture after independence and up until the arrival of the SEZ. As seen elsewhere in India, the dominant castes used the surpluses from their more extensive agricultural operations to invest in education, start small businesses, and obtain nonfarm employment (Harriss-White & Janakarajan, 1997; Jeffrey, 2001; Jeffrey & Lerche, 2000), giving them a foothold in the city. As Table 2 shows, the large landholding Jat caste invested substantially in small businesses (with 44% of families having a shop or business before the SEZ arrived), many of which were extensions from their agricultural enterprises (such as becoming milk-middlemen or setting up tractor parts or repair stores). They also invested significantly in education and were moderately successful in obtaining formal sector employment (defined as salaried employment in either the public or private sector as opposed to temporary manual labor), with 31% of families having one such position in the household. All told, this diversification provided 44% of Jat families with a nonmenial foothold in the city.

The General Castes (mostly Brahmins) were also quite successful in diversifying, with 54% of families having a shop or business and 50% having a formal sector job. The latter reflects a more substantial investment in education than Jats, with 80% of General Caste families having a member educated past the 10th standard (compared to 69% of Jat families). This gave 58% of General Caste families a nonmenial economic foothold outside the village.

The Rajputs always had a presence outside the village, with the _thakur_’s family maintaining a large ancestral home (_haveli_) in Jaipur, where they also owned several blocks of shops, and more recently turned one of their urban plots into a tourist

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Caste category</th>
<th>Number and proportion of families in sample</th>
<th>% who have a business or formal employment outside the village</th>
<th>% who became dalals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>General</td>
<td>24 (26%)</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jat</td>
<td>16 (17%)</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OBC</td>
<td>21 (22%)</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SC/ST</td>
<td>33 (35%)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>94 (100%)</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note:* While Jats are considered OBCs in Rajasthan, as a dominant agrarian caste they are socio-economically distinct from other OBCs, and thus I separate them here and throughout the paper for analytical purposes.
The former thakur’s grandson, Mahinder Singh, was given an elite private education, and subsequently became an investment banker with a large American bank in Mumbai before returning to enter politics as the nominal village sarpanch (his mother was actually elected). When the SEZ came, he utilized his business acumen to develop some of the family’s land that lay adjacent to the SEZ into a high-end housing colony. He also utilized his family’s many, high-quality urban connections—which include former nobility and prominent political figures—to broker the land of their former peasant tributaries (now constituents) (Interviews, July 9, 2010; February, 16, 2011).

While lower castes also diversified out of agriculture, they did so mostly out of necessity as unskilled wage laborers. With little formal sector employment (9% of families) and few businesses (15% of families), only 6% of SC/ST families had an urban economic foothold outside the village besides casual wage labor, which 85% of SC/ST families were dependent upon. Such links to the city are not the kind that typically generate relationships that can be profitably utilized for business activities like land brokering. The lower castes had fewer extra-village contacts of sufficient quality to utilize for entrance into the brokerage economy.

Today’s unequal distribution of individual social capital thus has its roots in the caste and class inequalities bequeathed by the failures of post-independence land reform. I have shown that these unequal social networks created the opportunity for the unequal appropriation of rents from real estate markets. This is illustrated not simply by the incidence of dalals among different castes, but also, as the next section will show, by the hierarchy among them. I now turn to case studies of different categories of brokers, and the “reconversion strategies” (Bourdieu, 1984, pp. 110, 142, 150; Wacquant, 1998a, p. 27) that they use to turn social capital back into economic capital.

9. RECONVERSION STRATEGIES AND THE BROKERAGE HIERARCHY

Laduram Meena was the elected village head (sarpanch) of Rajpura when the SEZ arrived in 2005. At that time, he was a moderately large landholder and had a small real estate partnership operating in areas closer to Jaipur. While it is alleged that he took large bribes for not opposing the transfer of village grazing land to the SEZ, what is definitely true is that he was very well placed to take advantage of the SEZ’s effects on Rajpura’s property market. His contacts from his previously existing real estate business, buttressed by his extra-village connections through the Congress party, gave him a rich set of ties with which to broker deals in the village. By his own estimation, at the height of the boom during 2005–08, he was facilitating fifty deals a month. He explained to me that all of the real estate companies in Jaipur knew him, and his real estate partnership—operating from a formal office in Rajpura’s market—was thus operating as a nodal point in the network, bringing in smaller dalals to share in the commission when someone closer to the seller was needed. Other villagers claim that he used these property deals as a form of political patronage, distributing commission opportunities or information to gain the political support of key people in different castes. What is clearly true is that his possession of contacts and associated information about the real estate business (current prices, potential buyers, the plans of the SEZ) were assets that led many villagers to seek out his company and patronage, or “to sit near him” in village parlance.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Caste category</th>
<th>Number of families in sample</th>
<th>Average size of family (Ha.)</th>
<th>% who own a shop or business</th>
<th>% who have formal sector employment</th>
<th>% who have a business or formal employment outside the village</th>
<th>% doing informal wage labor</th>
<th>% with family member educated to 10th class or higher</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>General</td>
<td>24 (26%)</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jat</td>
<td>16 (17%)</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OBC</td>
<td>21 (22%)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SC/ST</td>
<td>33 (35%)</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>94 (100%)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2. Caste-wise distribution of economic, social, and cultural capital.
dissimulates on the size of his newly gained wealth, he has recycled these real estate earnings into the purchase of at least 50 bighas (12.5 hectares) of new farmland, commercial and residential plots around the SEZ and Jaipur, a petrol pump license, a water tanker business, a large building he rents out as small shops and migrant labor accommodation in the Rajpura market, several more shops in a nearby town, and an expansion of his already large house. In Laduram’s case, social capital derived from economic and political capital has generated substantially more economic capital, which he has partly recycled back into political capital and an “expanded reproduction of social capital” (Bourdieu, 1993, p. 33).

Beneath the big or meta-dalals like Laduram Meena are the moderate sized dalals like Gangaram Choudhary, a young Jat from a family with 50 bighas of land in neighboring Neempur. Gangaram had been working as a driver in Jaipur and used those contacts to cut about 20–25 deals, netting, in his estimation, $12,000 (though this is probably an under-estimate). Smaller than him is Mahinder Choudhary, also a Jat who leveraged his contacts as a milk-middlemen to do four or five deals at a low price, and used the money of which he reinvested in a cold drink shop in Rajpura’s market. These Jats had already begun to diversify from their significant agricultural holdings before the SEZ, and used the social capital from that diversification to make economic capital in the real estate boom, which they have now invested in other enterprises. Many of these medium and large dalals are now applying their experience and contacts gained through brokering land around the SEZ to brokering agricultural land near other peri-urban development projects, such as Jaipur’s new “ring road.”

At the very bottom of the dalal hierarchy are those like Mahesh Bhunker, an uneducated lower caste (SC) small farmer and laborer, who aspire, with very limited success, to tap into the brokerage business as a way out of dire economic circumstances. I lived with Mahesh, his wife Lada and their three young kids for most of my fieldwork. Mahesh and his two brothers lost their combined 25 bighas of land for the SEZ, but were only compensated for seven because 18 did not have an updated title. They sold their compensation plots quickly and consequently at a low price, and used the money to build concrete houses and buy 10 bighas of not very productive farmland 20 km away. Mahesh is unemployed and two kidney stone operations have left him physically unable to do hard manual labor as well as deeply in debt. The family’s only income was Lada’s periodic $2 per day from the National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme. The loss of their farmland and livestock has greatly reduced their diet, visible in the undernourishment of their children. While only partially literate and not particularly savvy in business matters, Mahesh saw a potential solution to their difficulties when Lada’s young cousin Rajesh from another village expressed interest in investing his dalali earnings into a plot in Rajpura, for which he would provide the advance and then try to re-sell. Mahesh could act as his local dalal and earn 1% commission.

As Rajesh’s dalal, Mahesh helped to find a seller, an older Dalit widow from his sub-caste and her son, who in turn were represented by the Dalit dalal with the DVD store introduced earlier. After many meetings and affirmations of good will expressed over cups of chai and shared beedis, a purchase agreement was struck between the parties and their dalals, though the widow herself sat on the floor outside with the women of Mahesh’s family—to buy the plot for $26,000. Within a few months, before the cousin had to deliver the full amount to the seller, he had found an outside buyer willing to take it for $46,000, netting $14,000 after registration costs and bribes to the land records official (patwari). However, the cousin refused to pay Mahesh 1% of the full purchase price, arguing that the transaction costs that he advanced should be subtracted from the total. After the exaggerated professions of good faith, kinship, and camaraderie, Mahesh ruefully observed, “the relationship has been ruined” (rishta barbad ho gaya) (Fieldnotes, January 30, 2011). His family ate better for a month or two, adding some milk products back into their diet, but given the size of their existing debt, the income was not very significant. The trust between Mahesh and his cousin, not to mention that between Mahesh and the widow, had facilitated the transaction but then quickly evaporated.

While people like Mahesh do not have what villagers call the “hi-fi” contacts necessary to make many deals, and particularly the larger deals with outside investors, they may be lucky enough to plug into a smaller deal through kinship networks or because they are needed by another dalal to establish trust with a seller of his sub-caste. Mahesh has lower quality social contacts than the dalals mentioned above, and he was lucky to mobilize his tenuous connection with his wife’s cousin—what Bourdieu (1990, p. 168) calls “practical kinship”—to conclude one deal. Unfortunately, the meagerness of his social capital, combined with his lack of cultural capital (specifically business savvy), prevented him from converting this connection into economic assets of any significance. Real estate speculation is a social game that people have unequal abilities to play, and Mahesh’s “hand” is not very strong (see Bourdieu, 1990, p. 188). But the prospect of making fast and easy cash from brokering village land is a tempting resolution to his economic hardships, giving him and others in his position what Bourdieu would call a “stake in the game.”

10. SOLVENTS OF SOLIDARITY: SOCIAL AND POLITICAL EFFECTS OF BROKERAGE

Mahesh’s fate at the hands of his cousin indexes the major social and political consequences of land brokerage in the villages surrounding the SEZ. The first is that the pool of trust that the locally-situated dalals exploited to facilitate the alienation of village land to outside investors has been undermined. Many sellers, particularly less educated ones in the lower castes, subsequently felt cheated by the dalals who had more information than them about the SEZ and the land’s value in the new context. Many sold at what were retrospectively very low prices, in part because they were under economic pressure to sell quickly, but also because they lacked information about what an SEZ was and what it would do to land prices if they waited. In the early stages, some did not even know that an SEZ was coming. As Brahmin dalal Ramal Sharma explained to me, “The farmers got very little, they didn’t know what the price was. In the beginning, people didn’t even know about the SEZ and were getting only Rs. 1–2 lakh [$2,000–$4,000 per bigha]. Twenty-five percent sold without knowing that the SEZ was coming.” Anyway, he explained matter-of-factly, he and the Jaipur dalal, “would each take 2½%” (Fieldnotes, February 23, 2010). While brokers’ connections with urban investors gave them privileged access to useful information about land markets, rather than share this information with fellow villagers, they used it for their own advantage. Some dalals actively cheated illiterate farmers who could not read the documents they were signing. Dinesh Raegar and his two brothers are illiterate Dalit men who sold the compensation rights for their six bighas of land for a paltry $18,000, thinking that they were only selling three bighas. Now reduced to a landless laborer, Dinesh says, “It has been a total
loss for us. The *dalal* deceived us. The *dalals* take way too much advantage” (Fieldnotes, July 15, 2010). My survey shows that lower caste (SC/ST) families fared the worst in navigating land markets, receiving on average over $13,000 less per hectare on their compensation plot sales than the upper (General) castes. While many brokers became fantastically wealthy and built rural mansions, many of those who sold cheaply through them became proletarianized and ruefully watched the value of their former land multiply exponentially.

This has created significant anger toward the *dalals*, who are seen as having benefited massively from the SEZ at the expense of their fellow villagers. Phrases such as “the *dalals* looted us,” “sold the village cheaply,” “fooled people,” “ruined us,” “snatched land,” and “took advantage of the common man,” were very common in my many conversations with farmers. Of the former village sarpanch, “the biggest dalal of them all,” Dinesh Raegar expressed a common sentiment: “He cuts people’s throats after robbing their pockets. He completely takes advantage. The *dalals* have benefited, not the farmers” (Fieldnotes, July 16, 2010). Brokers were seen as guilty of violating social norms of reciprocity and fairness, which was particularly egregious in such a serious matter as people’s land, the ultimate economic asset and source of honor in any village setting. As one youth put it, “They sold off the whole village’s land [to others] . . . and ate commission.”

In this view, *dalals* had taken advantage of their fellow villagers for their own enrichment and that of “outsiders” (*baharwalle*) who were now reaping fortunes from their former land.

Such interpretations of the situation were not, of course, accepted by *dalals* themselves. To begin with, most brokers used the English term “property dealer” to refer to themselves rather than the more stigmatized Hindi term *dalal*. In their eyes, they were not mere middlemen or fixers, but legitimate businessmen. While many of them privately admitted to me that they facilitated land sales at “very low prices,” they publicly dismissed the hostility of their fellow villagers as the envy that they facilitated land sales at very low prices, *looted us,* “snatched land,” and “took advantage of the common man,” were very common in my many conversations with farmers. Of the former village sarpanch, “the biggest dalal of them all,” Dinesh Raegar expressed a common sentiment: “He cuts people’s throats after robbing their pockets. He completely takes advantage. The *dalals* have benefited, not the farmers” (Fieldnotes, July 16, 2010). Brokers were seen as guilty of violating social norms of reciprocity and fairness, which was particularly egregious in such a serious matter as people’s land, the ultimate economic asset and source of honor in any village setting. As one youth put it, “They sold off the whole village’s land [to others] . . . and ate commission” (Fieldnotes, April 8, 2010). In this view, *dalals* had taken advantage of their fellow villagers for their own enrichment and that of “outsiders” (*baharwalle*) who were now reaping fortunes from their former land.

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Then a plump farmer named Kalaram Choudhary got out of a new white Maruti-Suzuki car and walked over to the *chai* stall. As he approached, the others gave me a sly look, and for my benefit asked him the same question I had been asking them: “Is there loss or benefit because of the SEZ?”

**KC:** The SEZ is good. There’s excellent work inside it . . . It’s good for everyone.

**Farmer 1:** It’s good for him because he gets rent.

**KC:** No, it’s good for everyone.

**Farmer 2:** He’s a rich man. A big man.

**Farmer 1:** He’s a property dealer.

**KC** (with raised voice): The SEZ is good for everyone. It’s not bad for anyone. Very good work has been gotten . . . Hard workers get work. The rest are sitting here (gesturing to the *chai* stall benches).

**Farmer 3:** He got money from being a commission agent and selling people’s land. Then he used the money to buy a JCB machine and rent it out to Mahindra.

At this point one of the critical farmers turned to me and, in answer to a question I had asked earlier, said, “These people don’t let us start a protest organization (sanghatan)” (Fieldnotes, February 22, 2010).

Brokers’ attempts to morally launder their economic gains as normatively legitimate largely failed. In Rajpura, as in the Malaysian village studied by Scott (1985), “new opportunities for ‘profit-making’ have far outpaced the normative means available to justify taking full advantage of them” (p. 225). Nevertheless, other farmers were under no illusion that the older norms still had any sanctioning power. Many simply took it as a fact that now “everyone just builds their own house” (*sab apne apne ghar banate hai*). As the village economy shifted away from agriculture, there was anyway little need for economic cooperation across classes, making compliance with a peasant “moral economy” (Scott, 1976, 1985) largely irrelevant for those doing well in the new dispensation. While brokers might still be sensitive to *chai* stall slander that eroded their symbolic capital, they were now starting to keep different company and had large houses to retreat behind. While norms of fairness, honesty, respect for land, and general village solidarity vis-a-vis outsiders might inevitably have fallen by the wayside as the village urbanized, brokers’ alacrity in turning their social relations into capital greatly expedited the process.

As the statement of the last farmer suggests, brokers also helped to prevent collective action among the majority of farmers who felt aggrieved by the SEZ. While the initial aspirations generated by the prospects of easy real estate gains encouraged by Rajasthan’s compensation model prevented initial organized resistance to the SEZ as seen elsewhere in India, the work of *dalals* and the trail of bitterness they have created have undermined any subsequent potential for collective claims making on the SEZ and state government. There is now widespread anger and disappointment in the villages as the government still has not constructed the compensation plots allotted to farmers (even though most have already sold their rights to them), only 14% of families have received any employment in the SEZ (all of it temporary and low-paying work through sub-contractors), and the promised infrastructure improvements to the village never materialized (and indeed, the SEZ’s plan calls for cutting off the main access road to Rajpura’s market). A substantial amount of money flowed through the hands of farmers who sold their compensation plots, but it was mostly the upper castes who were able to invest this money into profitable avenues—with noproductive linkages between the SEZ and surrounding economy, this consisted almost entirely of further land purchases, small shops, and usury. After paying debts and building new houses, the majority of families—and especially SCs and OBCs—did not wind up with income-generating-assets equivalent to what they lost (see Levien, 2012). As Figure 2 shows, my survey found that 65% of total families and 88% of lower caste families reported having less income after losing their land for the SEZ. Even more disturbing was that 50% of families and 75% of the lower castes reported having less food. In terms of subjective well-being, 76% of farmers and 88% of lower castes said that they received more “loss” (*mukshan*) than “benefit” (*fayda*) from the project. This is, to put it mildly, evidence of an extreme development failure. Yet, despite a majority of families being worse off than before and sharing strong grievances toward the SEZ, there has been little in the way of collective action.
When I asked angry and distraught farmers why they did not start a sanghatan (a protest organization) to press for their demands, the common response was that all unity has decreased ("ekta kam ho gaya") and everyone just looks out for themselves. Dalals often figured prominently in the explanation. An old farmer named Puranji, for example, attributed the lack of resistance to the fact that there are "lots of dalals" and, because of them, "many have sold." They therefore have nothing left to fight for. Moreover, like the farmer introduced earlier at the chai stall, he said that some of the dalals are "big men" in the village, implying that they would not tolerate other farmers organizing against the SEZ, whose continued growth they have a large stake in. When I asked another farmer, whose family had been opposing the acquisition of their land, whether anyone in the village had supported them, he said, "No, everyone has sold out" (Fieldnotes, December 18, 2010). Another farmer explained: "There is no unity. The people of this village are dalals" (Fieldnotes, February 3, 2011).

So, while the project has undermined the economic well-being of a large proportion of farmers, collective action has been limited to one brief protest that was orchestrated by village heads (who are also dalals) in front of the SEZ and which was intended to pressure the government to physically construct the long-promised compensation plots (something that would not help the majority of farmers who had already sold their rights to them). In the absence of any collective political action, resistance has been limited to isolated, “everyday forms” (Scott, 1985) like fence-puncturing, temporary re-occupations of land for agricultural purposes, and a few isolated skirmishes with government officials. On the intra-village level, it is limited to a dissimulated “war of words” (Scott, 1985), which now lacks material force.

While it is impossible to know whether collective action would have been forthcoming without the actions of brokers, what is clear is that they have been agents of social dissolution, violating the social norms and undermining the trust that would be necessary for collective action. Paradoxically, these dalals match precisely Krishna’s (2002) description of “new,” well-connected village leaders who act as mediating agents between their fellow villagers and the state and market. Krishna argues that these new leaders “activate” social capital for democracy and development. My analysis suggests precisely the opposite: far from activating social capital for collective good, these mediators between village and city use their endowments of social capital for private gain, exploiting the trust of their fellow villagers, and undermining the norms and trust that might enable collective action.

11. CONCLUSION

This analysis suggests that social capital is at least as plausibly seen as an unequally distributed form of individual power rooted in class inequalities than a collective group asset adhering at the level of a village, region, or nation. Rural India is hardly alone in being characterized by inegalitarian class structures. The Bourdieuian conception of social capital encourages us to see these agrarian class structures as constituted not only by unequal distributions of economic and cultural capital, but also by related inequalities in the extent and quality of social connections. Building on previous applications of Bourdieuian theory to rural inequality in India (cf. Desai & Dubey, 2011; Jeffrey, 2001; Jeffrey et al., 2008), I have used the case of rural land brokerage to show how individual social capital contributes to the ability of dominant classes (which correspond tightly with dominant castes) to monopolize benefits as the intermediaries of economic change.

In addition to expanding pre-existing inequalities, I have also tried to show that such monetization of individual social networks is likely to cannibalize trust and undermine existing norms, and in the process reduce the solidarity necessary for collective action. It is especially in conditions of rapid socio-economic change, I would suggest, that networks, norms, and trust are least likely to hold together in ways that make them a composite stock of generalized potential for cooperation. In other words, it is precisely in the process of economic growth that networks are most likely to be used for individual advantage, trust used and abused, and old norms thrown into question.

It is not simply that different definitions of social capital, by focusing on different aspects of social life, lead to different conclusions about development. Rather, this analysis suggests that the collective social capital thesis lacks a plausible theory for social capital.
of how networks, norms, and trust relate to each other across various scales and over time. By collapsing different aspects of social structures—networks, norms, and trust—into a single collective asset of various social units, it is unable to see the tensions between these distinct features of social life and the ways in which they interact dynamically during a process of social and economic change.

By anchoring social connections in an analysis of social inequality, and separating rather than conflating networks, norms, and trust, Bourdieu’s theory of social capital is better able to explain who captures the benefits of economic development. Instead of seeing villages with high or low social capital, this lens helps us to see different fractions of an inequalitarian society constantly cultivating and maintaining connections—what Bourdieu calls “practical groups” (1990, p. 170)—of higher or lesser value, through which they might reasonably expect to receive material or symbolic advantages (see also Blok, 1974, p. 151; Wolf, 1966). The practical groups that the poor are able to forge from their social networks are often less extensive, and are always of a lower quality: they are connected to people who bring less material and symbolic advantages (Reall, 2001; Cleaver, 2005). When an outside source of wealth is introduced into a village—in this case an SEZ and associated property markets, though it could be an oil or mineral discovery, a government development scheme, or anything that introduces a new source of value—, those with more extensive and cosmopolitan connections find opportunities for brokerage and rentiership, and are able to align with outsiders to the detriment of fellow villagers. In the case examined here, well-connected villagers were able to use their social capital to make possible, and thereby profit massively from, new real estate opportunities, exploiting what trust they could mobilize among their fellow villagers. Many who sold their land through them subsequently felt that these brokers profited at their expense, breeding distrust and unleashing a symbolic struggle over norms that undermined any kind of collective claims-making on the SEZ developers and the government. Those with higher social capital are, in this view, the ones who are most likely to violate existing norms and trust, dissolving solidarity in the pursuit of economic capital.

It might be argued that the Rajasthani villages studied here simply represented cases of particularly low collective social capital. But such an argument begs the question of how, in certain places and times, shared trust and norms can contain individuals’ exploitation of unequal social connections. If it is the case that in other places intra-village relations of solidarity prove stronger than extra-village relations based on individual profit-seeking, then it explains very little to call these cases of high social capital. They might equally be called cases of low inequality in social capital. The difference is that only the latter conception allows one to acknowledge inequalities in social networks, study their historic roots, and examine how their use effects norms, trust, and collective action in a process of economic change. This requires separating the elements of social life that the social capital thesis collapses into composite indices. The conditions under which such a reduction is least tenable are precisely those that are of the greatest interest to the study of development.

It may be more promising, then, to hypothesize that uniformly low levels of individual social capital, rooted in more egalitarian social structures, lend themselves the most to social solidarity and to inclusive development. Given the high levels of social inequality in many parts of the agrarian Global South today, development would best be served by removing these inequalities of which individual social capital is an expression, rather than trying to harness elusive forms of trust and solidarity: redistributive land reforms, for example, rather than self-help groups. If social capital is an aspect of social inequality and a means of steering resources toward those who already have them, it is an obstacle not an asset for development.

NOTES

1. A Special Economic Zone (SEZ), to be explained more fully later, is an economic enclave that offers a more liberalized business climate than what prevails in the rest of a country.

2. The work of Coleman (1988, 1990) arguably constitutes a hybrid position: while he saw social capital as a public good adhering in multiple kinds of social relations (as Putnam later did), his focus was on how it facilitated the actions of individuals (like Bourdieu). While he recognized that it was not distributed equally (1990, pp. 314–315) and was used for individual ends, he did not emphasize as much as Bourdieu that social capital was a source of power rooted in class inequalities. This paper focuses on Putnam and Bourdieu’s conceptions of social capital because it is the former that has been the most influential in the sociology of development, and because it is the latter that the author finds most useful for research.

3. In their study of civil society and development in the Quichua regions of Honduras, Bebbington and Perrault (1999) argue that social capital should be seen on multiple scales, from local to national. However, they do not consider social capital as something unequally distributed among individuals, which is surprising given their observation that slightly better-off families received more development benefits from the activities of civil society organizations (1999, p. 411).

4. In a comprehensive study of rural middlemen in Uttar Pradesh, Srivastava and Chaturvedi found that these mediators connected villagers to government programs and services for commission not philanthropy (1986, p. 61), and that 90% of their clients paid them money to influence government officials (1986, p. 57). In another illuminating study, Reddy and Haragopal (1985) found that such “fixers” in Andhra Pradesh exploited the difficulty that less educated rural groups encountered when engaging a distant and complex bureaucracy. These fixers provided distorted information, steered resources to political allies, and ensured that rural people had to pay extra for a fraction of the development benefits to which they are entitled. Reddy and Haragopal thus persuasively conclude that the existence of fixers reflects a failure of development (1985, p. 1154). For an excellent analysis of how student dalals play a similar role at a provincial university, see Kumar (2012). These studies, along with the present one, cast great doubt on Krishna’s characterization of such mediators as public-spirited servants of their village.

5. In Distinction, Bourdieu discusses the upper classes’ skills in maintaining “connections” as an important means of reproducing their class position (1984, p. 110). He also suggests that low social capital can be responsible for “downclassing”: in other words, the inability to maintain connections can prevent the inter-generational transmission of economic and cultural capital (1984, p. 150). Finally, Bourdieu posits social capital as an explanation for why those investing in devalued diplomas tend to be the last ones to recognize it; low social capital provides the lower classes with inadequate access to timely information (1984, p. 142). In Algeria 1960, Bourdieu writes that the sub-proletariat’s
“less extensive and less strong network of social relations” is both a cause and consequence of their unstable employment (1979, p. 36). In all of these instances, social capital acts as a mechanism of class reproduction or mobility.

6. In his study of the impact of colonial capitalism on the Kabyle, Bourdieu (1979) writes, “With growing adaptation to the capitalist economy and growing assimilation of the corresponding dispositions comes increasing tension between the traditional norms which impose duties of solidarity towards the extended family and the imperatives of an individualistic, calculating economy” (p. 48).

7. All villages and individual names have been changed.

8. While generating household data from individuals has the risk of slightly over-sampling large families, there were no complete household lists available for the villages (which is common in rural India), and there is no reason to expect that this biased the results in any particular direction.

9. The total number of households was taken from Census of India (2001).

10. What the graph also shows is that this speculative interest began in 2004, a year before the SEZ was announced. This is because politicians and bureaucrats with inside information about the coming SEZ, and those they tipped off, bought land cheaply from unsuspecting farmers through dozens of benami (ghost) companies (of which the author has a list). Once the SEZ was announced, the land’s value immediately multiplied.

11. While this is an estimate, and government agencies keep no records of this, multiple brokers involved in buying and selling these plots consistently gave this as their estimate.

12. A land mafia, in rural India, refers to a group of people that routinely applies coercion and intimidation to produce, or take advantage of, legal ambiguities in land holdings so as to obtain control of land, often at a discount.

13. Chai stalls are key informal gathering points for men in rural India.

14. Sitting among several brokers, one Brahmin broker explained to me, “They are any kind of contact (or contacts made just like that), not caste contacts” (Aise hi sampark. Jati ki sampark nahi hai) (Fieldnotes, June 30, 2012).

15. While Jats are now considered OBCs in Rajasthan, they are socio-economically distinct from other OBCs and thus I separate them here for analytical purposes.

16. The per caste average landholdings presented above represent the distribution of land at the time of the SEZ in 2005. While land was subdivided and occasionally sold in the period between independence and the arrival of the SEZ, interviews, analysis of land records, and other studies of land distribution in Rajasthan suggest that the overall-caste-wise distribution of land has not changed appreciably since land reforms.

17. For a similar example of brokers attracting the resentment of those at their mercy, see Wacquant’s (1998b, p. 23) analysis of boxing matchmakers.

18. See Levien (2013b) for an overview of land struggles in India, and a discussion of the factors affecting their emergence and character.

19. See Bernstein (2010) for a good overview and analysis of the vast literature on agrarian class structures.

20. This study thus lends support to Desai and Dubey’s (2011) inference, based on evidence of greater socio-economic inequalities between castes in developed villages and small cities compared to less developed villages, that inequalities between castes might be exacerbated in the process of economic growth. Desai and Dubey also identify the importance of social networks, which they also conceive in Bourdieuian terms as social capital. The India Human Development Survey (IHDS) on which they draw operationalizes this social capital as knowing anyone in school, the medical field, or government (2011, p. 49). This ethnographic study complements their large-N survey analysis by illustrating the concrete ways in which economic capital is converted into social capital and vice versa in the process of economic growth, but also identifies the importance of social networks formed through businesses and work. While the connections measured by the IHDS are likely to be more important in accessing government services, the business and work connections examined here are more likely to be important in taking advantage of economic growth. The upper castes have more of both, allowing them to capture disproportionate resources from both government and market.

REFERENCES

SOCIAL CAPITAL AS OBSTACLE TO DEVELOPMENT: BROKERING LAND, NORMS, AND TRUST IN RURAL INDIA


